"When we approach an enemy, to kill him, we kill him not because he's an evil person, but because we make use of the instrument of terror in order to create fear for others." 1 Feliks Dzerzhinskii, 1920 Recent scholarship on Soviet state violence has drawn attention to the distinction between violence as "terror" and violence as a "purge" of the body politic. The former refers to violence that is designed to communicate a message to a wider audience and ensure submission to state power.
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beyond ideology and within the framework of modern European state practices, especially during the First World War, 10 and indeed early modern techniques of state-building regarding the extraction of resources from the peasantry. 11 Besides, its ideology was not merely Marxist but was influenced by and drew from several intellectual strands, including its context of genesis in autocratic late imperial Russia. David Hoffmann has argued recently that it is more accurate to understand Soviet state violence as the result of practices of state violence already established and subsequently "ideologized," rather than as originating from ideology. 12 I understand this equation with a difference in emphasis, with ideology more centrally important and modern state practices harnessed to these ideological ends in the context of various economic and military/political crises, 13 although my focus is on elite discourse.
In addition to the central focus on the relationship between violence and the Bolshevik conception of the sacred, this article explores other aspects of Bolshevik discourse around violence and repression during the Civil War years , especially during the first year of Soviet power. The article's focus is upon the "external," publicly consumable language, but this language did not usually conceal a very different "internal" discourse. 12 Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses, 257-8. 13 Other recent works that stress the centrality of ideology in the Soviet system include David Brandenberger, 
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as theory met practice and general visions met concrete realities, and the ruling party was by no means monolithic in outlook. Publicly-aired debates were frequent, often furious, demonstrating the difficulty of distinguishing clearly the nature of public and private Bolshevik political discourse. Perhaps none was more significant in 1918, after the signing of the peace treaty with Germany, than the debates that flared up during the Red Terror between supporters and opponents of Cheka methods. Ultimately, the role of the political police and the instrument of "terror" as distinct from "revolutionary justice" were safeguarded by Lenin and the party leadership.
However, discussions within the Soviet Justice Commissariat regarding criminological theory and penal practice offer some alternative and no less intriguing insights into the Soviet approach to repression. Taken together, these issues would be of fundamental importance for the development of the Soviet state for the next twenty years and beyond.
The Red Terror: "Reading all about it"
From the very outset of their revolution, the Bolsheviks faced armed opposition from their opponents of varying political hue, and by the summer of 1918 they were faced with full-scale frontal civil war and widespread peasant revolts. The repressive actions of the Bolshevik state intensified as a result, as did the rhetoric of terror. 15 The assassination of Moisei Uritskii, the head 7 order to "make literal the trope of class war" and discredit the more moderate political orientations of the Mensheviks and SRs. 21 In doing this, the Bolsheviks were acting with political cynicism, or "ideological dissimulation," but also with genuine conviction regarding the objective alignment of forces in the international class struggle.
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The slogan of political absolutism, that there could be "no middle course" between the absolute power of the Bolsheviks and counter-revolutionary restoration in Russia, became an essential tenet of the Bolshevik mind-set during the Civil War. 23 Revolutionas Lenin had been insisting since 1905 -was war, 24 and the Civil War context reinforced this conviction. For the Bolshevik leadership, there appeared to be no essential difference between the repressive reality for the masses in autocratic tsarist Russia and the democracies of Britain and
America. In those democracies, the "horrible oppression of capital" kept the workers in "slave chains," with outright violence against the people once they voiced their demands. 25 Bolshevik reasoning here was that "violence" was the reality of any state system, whether the more subtle, "ideological" type practiced by democracies in peacetime to keep the masses in oppression, or the open, bloody violence of civil war. 26 In this way, the party provided an important source of legitimacy for its methods of rule: its detractors were hypocrites, or at best misguided, and the methods of the Bolsheviks were really no worse than those of any other state, but of course in the service of a just cause.
In fact, however, Bolsheviks repeatedly maintained that their hands were cleaner than those of their enemies. Violence is cruel, but this was something that, in general, Bolsheviks were not comfortable with. Those involved in establishing the new Soviet justice system took pride in the perceived distance between the "cruelties" of bourgeois states and Soviet power, which they viewed as "alien" to such cruelties. 27 Similarly Martin Latsis, a leading Chekist described by as it would to speak publicly in criticism of their own regime (see below). The target audience of such "public transcripts" was the Bolsheviks themselves -and mainly the Chekists in the case of the Vecheka Weekly -in addition to the wider public. James Scott has explained the importance of public discourse for the dominant group itself as target audience, as a means to "convince themselves anew of their high moral purpose." 31 Such discourse also tested the power of language to construct, rather than merely reflect, political realities, 32 something that would become more significant in the context of Soviet politics by the end of the 1920s.
For Smith, the "participating audience" was, in the main, the workers. In reality, however,
Bolshevik leaders struggled to communicate their message to an already small reading public, and even lower-level party members, that often did not understand the political terminology of Bolshevik newspapers. 33 For the Vecheka leadership, there was an added imperative to reach beyond the barrier between rulers and ruled. The methods of the Chekas often provoked comparisons with the infamous equivalent of the tsarist state, the so-called Okhrana. 34 The Weekly therefore published a section, "From the archives of the Tsarist Okhranka," to highlight the differences between the two police forces. Whereas the Okhranniki were considered to have been motivated by careerist and monetary purposes, the defenders of the worker-peasant government were supposedly possessed of justness and "force" (i.e. the force of the people). The journal declared that "Every worker should take a more or less active part in the suppression of counter- 
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To critics within the party, the Chekas had become too powerful, unrestrained and arbitrary. comrades who were critical of the institution, and he responded to the Chekist dismissal of criticism as "idle phrases" by insisting that these issues should be discussed publicly. 55 Osinskii, writing earlier in the Terror, felt it necessary to remind Pravda readers that even though terror was necessary, the "destruction of the bourgeoisie as a class" should not the executive committee in Pskov, for example, reasoned that "no absolutist state has managed to preserve itself in power by this bloody means." 58 Iakov Peters, one of the Vecheka leaders and the principle defender of his institution during these public confrontations, gave an interview to Izvestiia in late September in which he accepted that the Terror had often assumed "undesirable forms" in the provinces, and that the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class could not be accomplished through extermination. 59 However, the "openness" with which the Chekists conducted the Terror through the Weekly co-existed with a refutation of the legitimacy of dissent on matters of fundamental importance to them, though they did engage in debate. Chekists were vituperative in confrontations with their critics, even though they acknowledged the inadequacies of local Chekas.
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58 Ibid, 9. On October 22 Izvestiia published a stinging response to Tikhomirnov's article from the editorial board of the Weekly.
60
The "constitutional" arguments of the Vecheka's opponents were described as "philistine" and "petty-bourgeois" in nature. Local soviets were alleged to be composed, frequently, of "kulak" (exploitative rural) elements. The composition of such soviets allegedly contrasted with the leadership of the Chekas, who were described as mostly Bolsheviks of long standing. 61 More basically, the article contended that the Soviet Constitution, which imagined a socialist state, could not truly be realized until the final destruction of counterrevolution and the bourgeoisie.
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These debates exposed significant fault-lines within the party and between state institutions regarding the nature of the Soviet state, though Bolsheviks envisaged its eventual withering away.
Chekists reasoned that it would be inappropriate, perhaps fatal for the revolution, to place the dictatorship under legal restrictions at a time of civil war. Were not the methods of struggle of the Chekas the highest revolutionary laws?, one contributor asked rhetorically in the Weekly. 63 In addition, what is evident here is how Chekists replicated the terms of debate used by Bolshevik leaders against the non-Bolshevik socialists -the supposedly "philistine," "petty-bourgeois" nature of their views, suggesting their illegitimacy -but applied these to Bolshevik critics.
On October 28, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets (VTsIK, the Soviet government) adopted a resolution that affirmed the rights of local soviets to Vecheka. It only stated, however, that decisions of Chekas could be overruled through the Cheka hierarchy (not by any other authority). 64 On November 6 the Extraordinary Sixth All-Russian
Congress of Soviets declared that the "worker-peasant power" was "strengthened and consolidated," and announced an amnesty for political prisoners (although certain types of prisoner, such as Tsarist gendarmes, were excluded from the amnesty). 65 The official policy of Red Terror can be considered to have ended at this point, though the use of terror continued during the Civil War. 66 The party was in agreement that reforms were required and that greater respect for the rule of law should be raised, and the Vecheka leadership consented. However, it was surely pleasant for Chekists to hear Lenin's assessment, delivered at a Vecheka rally on November 7, that the attacks on the institution were "all narrow-minded and futile talk" that reminded him of " [Karl] Kautsky's homily on the dictatorship, which is tantamount to supporting the bourgeoisie." 67 The
Vecheka's continued existence was assured for the rest of the Civil War, and the party's Central
Committee resolved in December that there should be no place for "malicious criticism" of the state's organizations (namely the Vecheka) in the press. This is not to suggest that Leninism can be reduced to this concept, or that it is the essential key to our understanding of the Soviet state. 69 It does, however, serve as a very useful heuristic technique that allows us to make greater sense of Leninism as a political phenomenon. 70 The historian of fascism Emilio Gentile, perhaps the leading advocate of the concept in recent years, identifies the characteristics of a political religion as, first and foremost, the teleological, eschatological orientation of an ideology that defines the meaning of life and "ultimate ends of human existence."
In addition, the existence of a "mythical" and "sacred" history connected with a "chosen people"
that would serve as "the regenerating force of all mankind" points to the messianic dimension of political religions. 71 Most pertinent to the present discussion, a feature associated with political religions is the sanctification of violence for the ends described. Passmore's assertion that political religions theory "relies" on a distinction between a manipulative political elite and passive masses (658-9).
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the nature of religion, and he questions why the sort of emotional-intellectual attributes of socalled political religions should be considered religious, as opposed to merely political, in nature.
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In response to this, I refer to Philippe Burrin's important clarification that "It would be better to start with the metaphorical nature of the term 'political religion' and to recognize that the adjective is more important than the noun." 74 One additional problem is that applying this concept to
Leninism might imply that Bolsheviks were "fanatics," thereby undermining their rationality as 
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Moscow.
85
Bolsheviks, after all, were militant atheists, and the state's anti-religious publications stressed the falsity of any sort of religious belief. 86 Before the revolution, Lenin had condemned the "God-builder" movement conceived by some Bolsheviks who sought to develop socialdemocracy as a form of religion.
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Yet it is also true that the ruling party had an "ambivalent" relationship with the sacred, and leading Bolsheviks sometimes publicly replicated explicitly religious language.
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It is quite evident here that despite their atheism, it was crucially important for Bolsheviks to invoke the spiritual and emotional strength of some sense of transcendent purpose to individual life within secular historical time. 89 It should not be surprising, then, that the Soviet institutions involved in direct armed struggles should celebrate their dead as martyrs, whose lives and deaths would be vindicated by the triumph of socialism. In an obituary in the Vecheka Weekly for a deceased young female Chekist, the editor wrote: "Awareness of such a bitter, difficult loss would be almost unbearable, if we did not know that we carry with us the great truth of Socialism, the great emancipation of all the exploited and deprived." The "pure blood" of the deceased had been given, with love, for the future of the world's workers. 
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of the service of an idea and capable of enormous sacrifices" was possible "only as the result of the Christian training of the human spirit."
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The revolution and the struggle against the "enemies of the people" that followed, then, served as the Bolsheviks' redemptive, sacrificial passage from the old world to the new. René Girard has explained that sacrificial customs are concerned with "a radically new type of violence, truly decisive and self-contained, a form of violence that will put an end once and for all to violence proposition that existence stands higher than a just existence is false and ignominious, if existence is to mean nothing other than mere life," and he reasoned that however sacred life may be, "there is no sacredness in his [man's
-sic] condition, in his bodily life vulnerable to injury by his fellow men." However, Benjamin's opposition of a "divine violence" to the "mythic violence" and fantasy associated with humanity's attempts to appropriate divine power through "law-making" and "law-preserving" violence, appears to be very different to Bolshevik attempts to 24 brilliantly argued, the Soviet concept of "active humanism" -the necessity of taking (violent) action to eradicate the sources of human suffering -was quite central to the representation of violence as morally good.
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In his excellent study of Soviet moral representations of violence through literature, Dariusz
Tolczyk identifies two literary strategies that were utilized in the 1920s in order to justify violence.
The first was based around the idea of tragedy. The historical necessity of violence requires actions that are themselves contrary to the actors' ultimate opposition to violence in human affairs, and so creates a certain amount of ethical ambivalence. We have seen that there was a significant amount of such ambivalence, even disdain, towards violence amongst Bolsheviks at all levels. The other, and according to Tolczyk principal strategy utilized, was ethical iconoclasm: a reversal of the negative moral connotations of violence. Not only is there no ethical hang-over, but where necessary violence becomes ethically positive in the service of the revolution due to "unquestioning faith" in the revolution as "salvation." Violence becomes "totally purified" in the process. 101 It would be a mistake, however, to see these two strategies in as distinct a manner as wrote of the French Revolution that "no-one can be gladdened by the spilling of blood, but with critical analysis of historical events it becomes clear to anyone that the French people were forced to resort to terrible means."
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Sometimes elements of both strands identified by Tolczyk were evident in the same text. One article in the central Izvestiia noted that "Terror for us is not a system, but a terrible necessity of the present decisive moment of world history." This was not, however, simply a case of the end justifying the means; the author made it clear that the sword was being wielded "in the name of the highest ideals of humanity," that a virtue could be made of necessity. 104 Indeed, Bolsheviks self-consciously inhabited a supreme ethical sphere, effectively "beyond good and evil" as understood in particular historical contexts. 105 In the words of an article in Petrogradskaia Pravda (quoting Clara Zetkin), "Bolsheviks cannot avoid measures that are not measurable on an ethicalhistorical scale."
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Such lofty language was not merely "external," for public consumption, but expressive of the convictions that had driven the party to power, and it was not merely the language of the party elite in the major cities. For example, the Cheka chairman of Bel'skii district in
Smolensk province told a local congress in early 1919 that the struggle ahead was for "the future of humanity." 107 The purification of violence, its sacralization as a means to the ultimate end, was sometimes made very explicit. In Bolshevik discourse, the purification of violence usually required a removal of focus from the act of violence to its practitioners. Simply put, violence in the interest of the revolution could not be compared as like with imperialist or reactionary violence. The agents of counter-revolutionary violence were often described as having been, quite literally, "bought" by international capital, or simply as defenders of their "monetary power." Their "base" (podlyi) motives stood in contrast to the supposed purity, selflessness and humanity of the fighters for Soviet power, as well as the justness of their cause. 108 To quote from an article of January 1919 in Petrogradskaia Pravda: "Violence, which the proletariat sets in motion, is sanctified (osviashchaetsia) in the eyes of the wide masses by that great goal which it serves!"
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In thus sanctifying their acts of violence, Bolsheviks were neither original nor unusual. In the context of modern Russian history they were clearly continuing -in power -the tradition of revolutionary terrorists in late imperial Russia to cloak themselves in innocence, as Susan
Morrissey has explained, to purify their acts of violence relative to the "real" violence of the imperial state. 110 Violence was also justified in both manifestations as an essential requirement for asserting and establishing its antithesis: nonviolence and human dignity. 111 The sacrality of violence in both types was strongly connected to the construction of an ethos of martyrdom and sacrifice (as discussed above), in a paradoxical willingness to assert the sacredness of life by relinquishing one's own and/or that of others. Scholars of revolutionary terrorism in late imperial
Russia have observed the centrality of self-sacrifice to the representation of such acts as virtuous, and perhaps to alleviating the guilt associated with the act of violence. in the first edition of the Commissariat's journal in August 1918, outlined the orthodox Marxist position that crime in capitalist society is a product of the anarchy of production that leads to social instability. "Every crime," he explained, "is a product of irreconcilable class antagonisms," and not a person's "free will." The corollary was that, with the disappearance of economic inequality, crime would eventually disappear.
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If all crime, then, was determined principally by forces external to the criminal, how should the state and the law deal with a criminal who was not, ultimately, responsible? Kozlovskii's article contained a fascinating discussion of the metaphysics of human nature. He disagreed with the assertion of the Austrian socialist lawyer Anton Menger that crime would continue to result from "human instincts" even under desirable social conditions. The implication of Kozlovskii's argument was not, however, that strong punitive measures or even "terror" would be inappropriate under proletarian law. In the transitional period between capitalism and communism, he explained, an enormous legacy of crime had transferred. Soviet penal policy would abandon the principle of "retribution" and seek, rather, the "correction" of the criminal. However, though cruelty would not be part of Soviet penal policy, "punishment" could not be dispensed with. The sole purpose of punishment would be the defense of society from criminal "encroachment." He reasoned that the state would need to act with "resolute surgical measures, measures of terror and isolation" for the reasoned that there could be no "softness" shown to those who act "consciously" (soznatel'no) to strangle the people. 127 Similarly, an article in the Weekly referred to former tsarist gendarmes, etc.
as "corrupt souls" that should be struck from the face of the earth. 128 This may be contrasted with Stuchka's assertion that he could not "reproach" the bourgeois intelligentsia because they were as responsible for their ideological views as for "the colour of their hair." understanding social issues may be considered a "central defining characteristic of modernity."
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The healing purpose of Soviet penal policy -the "treatment of criminal elements" rather than their punishment in a retributive sense -was explained by L. Savrasov, head of the Punitive Department and NKIu Collegium member. Prison was to be a type of "social clinic" that would treat inmates differentially; Soviet legal theorists appreciated that social conditions could produce individuals with nasty inclinations. 135 The task of re-education would involve both labour and "cultural-educational work" in the reformatories. Prisoners were to acquire a love of work, and this would allow them to join "the great family of the workers" as healthy, useful members. 136 In the enormous economic and military difficulties faced, as well as the reality of "White" terror. the Bolshevik discourse on violence, both a condemnation and embrace of it. 149 Condemning the horrifying violence of the First World War, they insisted that the way to eradicate such brutality for humanity was through truly just, class warfare. By the 1930s, as Dariusz Tolczyk explains, the initial justification that violence was required as a temporary means to defeat the revolution's enemies was beginning to wear thin, 150 and especially once the triumph of socialist construction had been declared by 1934. The openness that accompanied much of the violence of the Civil War began to disappear, and the violent police "mass operations" of the late 1930s were supposed to be "absolutely secret."
There were alternative currents in Bolshevik thought regarding violence and repression. In particular, Soviet legal theorists stressed the reform of deviants whereas Chekists were focused on repression, and the extent of the criticism levelled against the Cheka apparatus during the Red
Terror clearly indicates significant divergent tendencies within the party and state apparatus. The debates within the party during the Terror also suggest, as Michael Melancon has argued, the existence of a deep-rooted, more democratic political culture amongst grassroots Bolshevik activists within the soviet apparatus, one that was contrary to the Leninist vision of one-party rule backed up by the terror of the Chekas -the vision that ultimately triumphed. 151 Yet the "progressive" approach to penal reform was founded on the same utopian belief in the perfectibility of humankind and future society, the Salvationist impulse of Leninism, and the language of social medicine that served to justify violence. 
